Research
💡 Research interests
- Supply chain management
- Information asymmetry
- Demand information sharing
- Online platform operations
📕 Publications and Working Papers
- Xu Minghui, Yiwei Zheng, Xintong Shi, and Hui Shen, “Demand Information Sharing in a Green Supply Chain under Upstream Competition,” under the 2nd-round review, Naval Research Logistics.
- Develop a game-theoretic model with two competing manufacturers selling green products through a common retailer, who has a private signal and decides the sharing strategy.
- Identify three interacting effects that foster or undermine the incentives of firms to form an information-sharing partnership without or with a side payment contract in both serial and parallel settings.
- Capture green production technical cost as the mediator in governing the value of information sharing to each party and explore the effects of ecological awareness, green subsidy, and competition intensity.
- Explain the trend that platform tends to provide multiple versions of information sharing toolkits, and sellers are self-incentivized to choose their fits.
- Xu Minghui, Hui Shen, and Yiwei Zheng (2023), “Dynamic Pricing with Product Quality Information Updates Considering Consumer Time Preferences,” Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 43(10), 2989–3006. (in Chinese) [link]
- Develop a two-period model to explore the dynamic pricing strategy of the firm that sells experience products and the purchasing strategy of consumers who may strategically wait.
- Capture the endogenous time preference of consumers who choose to become strategic by exerting costly effort or to remain myopic with no cost, and examine the effect of such cost on each party.
- Incorporate two-sided quality uncertainty and online reviews to determine the value of information to the firm, consumer surplus, and social welfare by examining the effect of information accuracy.
- Zheng Yiwei and Minghui Xu, “Contract Unobservability and Information Sharing,” Work-in-progress.
- Explore the demand information sharing strategy of two competing retailers heterogeneous in channel efficiency with the upstream manufacturer in the context of contract (un)observability.
- Utilize passive belief to pin down equilibrium and compare preference orders over information sharing and (un)observable contracts of each member to boil down the value of two types of information.
- Uncover the mechanism of novelty results in equilibrium that both retailers may voluntarily share information and the manufacturer chooses to secretly withhold the price charged to each retailer.
